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The paper presents data on developments in inward private capital flows -- foreign 
direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity, portfolio debt, and bank financing -- to 
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and outlines their major structural and 
macroeconomic determinants. The paper focuses mainly on portfolio flows and FDI, with 
only a limited coverage of bank financing. Drawing on recent developments, selected key 
issues in managing private capital flows are highlighted for discussion. 
 
A.  Definition of EMEs and Data on Capital Flows 
 
There is no single, universally accepted definition of EMEs. We have chosen a 
broad definition that is used by major investors and their supporting agencies such as 
those who construct stock indices for various categories of countries. A full list and 
explanation of EMEs used by us is given in Annex 1. 
 
The data reported here are primarily drawn from the Balance of Payment Statistics 
reported in International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, 
supplemented by country sources, where available, in cases where IFS data are 
incomplete. In addition, we have consulted 2006 Global Development Finance published 
by the World Bank, but IMF data is our primary source. The definitions used and its 
relationship to other commonly used data sources are briefly noted in Annex 2.  
 
B.  Background and Motivation  
 
Net inward private capital flows to EMEs have risen sharply in recent years, while 
exhibiting significant period-to-period volatility. Some components of capital flows have 
been more volatile than others. Also, capital flows into some regions have been more 
volatile than in others.  
 
In 1996-1997 just before the onset of the Asian financial crisis, net inward private 
capital flows averaged $284 billion per annum. The size of these flows fell in 1998 to $ 
160 billion, due to reversals in both portfolio flows and bank lending. It rebounded 
significantly to $254 billion (annual average) during the global equity boom in 1999-
2000. It fell again in 2001-2002, when the equity boom collapsed, and since then has 
risen sharply to an annual average of in excess of $400 billion in 2003-2005.  
 
Asia, which witnessed largest growth in the inflow compared to other regions, 
also seems to have experienced the greatest volatility. Portfolio and bank inflows show 
much greater volatility than FDI. Both portfolio and FDI seem concentrated in regions 
and countries, while significant shifts in regional shares seem to be occurring over time. 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Harpaul Alberto Kohli for his valuable assistance in collecting, organizing, analysing 
and presenting data on which this report is based. The size, volatility and direction of these flows pose important challenges for policy 
makers, besides raising important questions for private investors as well. In addition to 
the challenges posed by massive capital inflows for the conduct of monetary policy, the 
volatility associated with these flows poses risk management challenges for both the 
private and public sectors. The issue of how best to mobilize stable capital flows, while 
ensuring resilience to unavoidable fluctuations in capital movements, is a continuing 
policy challenge for which country experiences are beginning to provide broad guidance.  
 
The paper aims to briefly summarize as best as possible the underlying forces 
determining the pattern of inward private capital flows to EMEs, and their components, 
drawing on recent official reports and academic studies on the subject, and on that basis, 
presents some issues for discussion. 
 
C.  Organization of the Paper  
  
The paper is organized as follows after this introductory section: 
 
•  Section 2 will present data on capital flows and will sketch out important 
features of private capital flows and their components—including their 
growth, volatility, and relative importance of different forms of capital flows 
 
•  Section 3 will highlight developments during 2005, when private capital 
flows to EMEs reached a new high  
 
•  Section 4 will assess and review some of the determinants of private capital 
inflows. It will also review recent reports and studies on developments in 
private capital flows, and the structural and financial policy responses by 
various countries 
 
•  Finally, in Section 5, several key issues for discussion are highlighted 
 
•  In addition, at the end of the report, a series of graphs and tables present the 
detailed data (by types of capital flows and by five regions for the period 
1990-2005) on which the report is based. 
      
 
II. Trends in private capital inflows 
 
The overall size and regional trends in private capital inflows -- sum of FDI inflows, 
net inflows of portfolio debt and equity, and net bank financing, all flows as defined in 
Annex 1-- are first reviewed, before discussing individual components of private capital 
flows.  























Source: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's Central Bank, Singapore Dept. 
of Statistics, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. 
 
Table 1: Total Private Capital Inflows by Region, 1990-2005 
 
Total Capital 
Inflows  1990 1991 1992 1993 19941995 19961997 19981999 20002001 2002 2003 20042005
Africa 1.0  1.3  4.0  2.8 7.3 8.9 7.7 17.1 12.9 14.1 7.4 5.2 1.9  -0.8  11.7 19.0
Americas 32.6  39.4  49.2 89.3 94.6 39.0 90.8
105.
0 94.1 86.9 75.9 55.5  40.8 37.1 51.3 69.6





















Europe -3.9  -0.7  5.7  17.6 2.8 34.7 30.7 48.8 26.8 24.9 15.3 7.9 50.7 62.7 94.1
133.
2
Middle East  -0.4  0.4  10.5  6.1 6.3 0.1 0.7 24.9 15.2 8.4 8.4 11.1 8.0  11.6 8.6 10.6
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Sources: IMF's IFS and WB's WDI. 
To fill in missing data, IMF’s WEO, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Stats, CEIC, 
WB's Gl. Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates.Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
  3During 2003-2005, a cumulative $1200 billion (4% of GDP) of private capital 
flowed into EMEs, compared to $720 billion (3 % of GDP) during 2000-2002 (Tables 1-
2, and Charts 1-3). The surge in capital inflows that began in 2002 continued through 
2005. Since 2001, the shift away from bank-based capital inflows towards portfolio 
inflows seems to have accelerated, and the share of portfolio flows in total inflows has 
risen sharply to 34% during 2003-2005 compared to 16% in 2000-2002. Although the 
growth in portfolio debt has gathered momentum due to the coming on stream of a range 
of structural reforms in EMEs, the growth in portfolio equity has outpaced the growth in 
debt. While all regions have benefited from the revival of demand for EME assets, 
Emerging Europe and Asia have captured much of the recent growth in inflows.  
 . 
Historic evolution of portfolio equity, portfolio debt, FDI, and bank financing by 
region (Americas, Asia, including central Asia, Middle East, Europe, and Africa) since 
1990 are shown in billions of dollars and as percentage of GDP in Tables 7-11 and 
Charts 4-8. Asia continues to dominate in the amount of capital inflows – both FDI and 
Portfolio inflows -, with Europe and Latin America also showing significant revival since 
2003, after several years of decline in inflows. Portfolio equity inflows in particular rose 
sharply in Latin America in 2005, while Europe experienced particularly sharp increases 
in portfolio debt since 2002. Both these regions have also shown strong recovery in FDI 
since 2002. Middle East and Africa also attracted both portfolio investment and FDI, but 
the size and growth of the flows was quite small relative to other regions. The recent 
sharp upsurge in oil prices seems to have led to increased private investment in oil export 
countries during the past few months but data to confirm this would be available only 
next year.  



















In reviewing the historic evolution of capital flows, it is useful to focus on different 
sub-periods corresponding to different degrees of openness to capital flows into EMEs. 
Prior to 1990, only a few emerging markets were open to foreign investment. Roughly 
from 1991 to 1996, there was a progressive opening of equity markets by EMEs, resulting 
in large inflows during that period. There followed a period of crisis in 1997-98 in the 
aftermath of the devaluation of the Thai Baht. Finally, there is the current period (1999 
onwards) of substantial opening and large capital flows into emerging markets in all 
regions. 
 
  4Table 2: Index of Openness to Capital Flows For 
Selected Countries 
   1985-90  91-96 97-98 99-2000 
Argentina 0.75 0.43 0.42 0.46 
Brazil 1 1 0.88 0.85 
Chile 1 1 1 0.923 
Colombia 1 0.97 0.84 0.85 
Ecuador 0.68 0.5 0.46 0.42 
Mexico 0.92 0.84 0.83 0.84 
Latin America    
Hong Kong  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.231 
India 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 
Korea 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.77 
Malaysia 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.77 
Philippines 0.92 0.88 0.85 0.85 
Singapore 0.23 0.23 0.35 0.42 
Asia    
Turkey 0.85 0.64 0.75 0.75 
South Africa  0.86 0.89 0.84 0.84 
 
 
A.  Shifts in the Direction of Capital flows 
 
The list of top ten recipients of total private capital inflows has changed 
significantly between 1994-95 and 2004-2005, with Thailand, Argentina, Indonesia, and 
Hungary dropping out, and Taiwan, Turkey, Russia, India, making the latest top ten 
(Tables 2, 12-14). The top ten list varies according to the type of inflow, with only a few 
countries being present among the top ten in more than one category of capital inflows 
(India in equity and bank financing; Hong Kong in FDI, Equity and bank financing; 
China in FDI and equity; Russia in FDI, Debt and Bank financing; Korea in equity and 
debt). European countries are among the top ten in both debt and bank financing. As an 
indicator of a reduction in the extent of concentration of capital inflows, the share of top 
three countries in total inflows has fallen significantly for all categories of capital flows. 
For example, the share of top three countries in global portfolio inflows into EMEs fell 
from 63% in 1994-95 to 33% during 2004-05. 
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Table 3:  Total Private Capital Inflow into EME 
Top 10 Countries 
    
Total Capital Flows 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
Brazil 33.6 China,  P.R.:  Mainland  85.2 
China, P.R.: Mainland  32.5 China, P.R.: Hong Kong  48.3 
Thailand 16.9 Taiwan,  China  27.4 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  16.3 Turkey  23.9 
Korea 15.2 Korea 23.4 
Argentina 14.4 Russia  23.3 
Singapore 13.1 India  23.1 
Indonesia 8.5 Singapore  21.9 
Mexico 7.0 Mexico  19.5 
Hungary 5.8  Brazil  19.4 
 
For Banks and Portfolio, Hong Kong's 1993 data substituted for 1994. 
 
Source: IMF's IFS.  
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India’s, & Indonesia’s central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
IMF Country Report 96/29, WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. 
 
 
B.  Growth, Volatility, and Concentration of Capital Inflows 
 
The long term trends in the size of various types of private capital flows is 
illustrated in Tables 15-17 where inflows during various sub periods are presented for 
different EME regions. Table below presents long term trends in different types of capital 
inflows and their relative shares.  
 
Table 4:  Total Private Capital Inflows by Type.  1990-2005 
 
EM Total  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
FDI  32.7  38.5 49.1 75.0 102.5 120.6 149.8 192.4  190.9 225.1 254.1 210.5 170.7 167.0 265.7 315.7 
Tot Portfolio  23.4  31.3 46.8 120.7  107.1 45.1  110.5 96.8  46.5 127.6  74.0 25.2 15.3 94.9 125.4  177.8 
Equity  4.3  6.3  14.0 45.1 34.7 22.2 38.2 32.8  11.4  104.2  85.8 27.4 11.5 72.4 72.1 122.7 
Debt  19.1  24.9 32.8 75.6 72.4 22.9 72.3 64.0  35.1  24.3  -9.7 -1.6 3.9  22.6  53.3  55.7 
Banks (Net)  -8.5 3.1  21.1 11.3 2.4  35.4 12.6 6.0  -77.4 -97.0 -74.6 -0.5  46.2 17.3 32.1 2.0 
                                                  
Total Capital 
Inflows  47.6 72.9  117.0 206.9  212.0 201.2 272.8 295.2  160.0 255.7 253.4 235.2 232.2 279.2 423.2 495.4 
 
Sources: Sources: IMF's IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
 


















Sources: IMF's IFS and WB's WDI. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's Central Banks, 
Singapore Dept. of Stats, CEIC, WB's Gl. Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, IMF Country Reports, IMF's WEO, & 
Centennial estimates. Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
 
FDI inflows nearly doubled during 2003-2005, with Asia and Europe absorbing 
most of the growth in inflows. Several years of declines in FDI inflows in Latin America 
was mostly reversed in the last two years. Africa too witnessed a significant expansion in 
FDI, although from a small base. Recent FDI growth  was driven in particular by 
investments in oil rich countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan), and in EU 
accession countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary) .Nevertheless, Asia continued to 
dominate, with China alone absorbing  25 % of total FDI inflows in 2005, reflecting in 
part increases in foreign investments in the banking sector.   South Africa recorded nearly 
five fold increases in direct investment, mainly due to large acquisitions in the banking 
and mobile phone sectors. Growth in FDI in India was modest in 2005, returning to the 
level reached in 2002, with its share in global FDI flows falling slightly. 


















Source: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, WB's 
Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. 
 
Portfolio capital inflows recovered strongly after the Asian crisis to a high of 
$127 billion (2 % of GDP) in 1999. It declined to an all time low of $15 billion in 2002 in 
the midst of the global equity price collapse. Since then it has recovered strongly to a new 
peak of over $178 billion in 2005, with Asia contributing to most of the recent growth. A 
near tripling of equity inflows into Europe, and a return of foreign investments into the 
local equity markets in Latin America also played an important role. Despite the volatility 
of these flows, their share in total private capital flows seems to be on the rise. 
















Source: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, 
CEIC, & Centennial Estimates. Hong Kong data missing before 1998. 
 
Portfolio inflows as well as bank inflows exhibit substantial volatility, with FDI 
flows remaining relatively stable.  
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While the volatility of portfolio debt inflows and that of FDI declined in the recent 
years of increased openness, those of portfolio equity and Bank financing have remained 
high. For portfolio debt, in particular, there is some evidence that widespread adoption of 
active debt management by issuers and financial innovations in the EME debt markets 
together could reduce debt market volatility- in terms of both financing volumes and risk 
spreads. Continued reforms of local equity markets should also lead to more resilient and 

















Source: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., & 
Centennial Estimates. Hong Kong Data missing before 1998. 
 

















Source: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & Indonesia's central banks, CEIC, & Centennial 
Estimates. Hong Kong data missing before 1998. 
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Both portfolio capital flows and FDI tend to be concentrated regionally, although 
some shifts in regional shares are surfacing, reflecting greater global competition for 
resources and broader adoption of policies to enhance access to foreign capital (Tables 18 
- 28). Subsequent to the Asian crisis, a progressively larger share of portfolio capital 
inflows has been drawn into Asia, in part reflecting both improved macroeconomic 
fundamentals as well as structural reforms to strengthen capital markets, with the share in 
Latin America   falling until 2004. The share of Europe in portfolio capital has recovered 
particularly strongly following several years of declines. Nevertheless the dominance of 
PR China, Hongkong and Taiwan together is striking. These three economies are on the 
top ten list and account for 34.5 % of total portfolio capital flows into EMEs in 2005.  
 
Gross syndicated bank lending to developing countries rose by about 74% in 
2005, and by 64 % in net (of amortization) terms to, according to World Bank’s GDF 
2006 report, with significant expansion reported in Europe and Asia. For the EMEs 
considered in this paper, and using the measure of net bank financing flows (net inflows 
of bank financing into EMEs minus net outflows of bank financing from the EMEs, 
including resident outflows) net bank financing declined in 2005 after a rapid rise in 
2004. The decline in 2005 was on account of large net outflows from the banking system 
in China, Hongkong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Mexico, Czech Republic, and Israel) which 
offset large inflows of bank financing into Europe (Russia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Turkey, Ukraine), other Asia (India, Korea, Kazakhstan) and Saudi Arabia. 
















Source: The IMF's IFS, and to fill in missing data, Taiwan's Central Bank, the Singapore Dept. of Statistics, & CEIC. 
Hong Kong data missing before 1998. 
 
In sum, in the period since 1999 developments in Private capital inflows show the 
following patterns of behavior: 
 
•  Significant shifts in regional and country composition of private 
capital inflows 
•  A massive growth in volumes, particularly since 2002  
  10•  Significant volatility historically, with many structural factors that 
could dampen volatility seems to be emerging in recent times 
•  Substantial concentration of flows both among regions and within 
regions 
•  Growing importance of portfolio capital relative to other forms of 
capital inflows. 
 
III. Developments during 2005 
  
  During 2005, our group of EMEs saw a record amount of private capital inflows 
totaling US$ 495 billion equivalent to 4.4% of GDP. This represented an increase of 
US$72 billion or 17% over 2004. The increase is even more impressive in the three 
relatively more stable sources of private finance -- FDI, portfolio equity and debt flows –, 
while bank lending showed a sharp drop in net outflows from US$32 billion in 2004 to 
only US$2 billion in 2005, for the reasons mentioned above. Total FDI flows reached 
US$315 (an increase of US$50 billion or 19%). Total equity portfolio flows were 
US$122.7 (increase of 98% over 2004). And, portfolio debt flows reached US$55.7 
billion (compared to US$53.3 billion in 2004). 
 
  Within these totals, Asia remained by far the largest recipient region with total 
flows of US$263 billion (4.9% of GDP), of which FDI accounted for US$165 billion, 
portfolio equity US$93 billion, and portfolio debt US$18 billion. Asia’s total capital 
inflows, however, were only 1% above 2004 (US$257 billion) because of net outflows of 
bank loans totaling US$14 billion. Emerging Europe had the second largest capital flows 
totaling US$133 billion, which represented a 41% increase over 2004 (US$94 billion); 
net flow of bank financing rose to US$30.3 billion compared to only US1.5 billion in the 
previous year. Emerging Market Economies in Latin America showed a healthy increase 
of 36% and came third at US$70 billion. Africa attracted US19 billion and Middle East 
US$10.6 billion. 
 
IV. Determinants of Portfolio Equity Flows 
 
Many of the macro-economic and structural determinants that led to increased 
demand for EME assets since 2002 - discussed in the Capital Flow Report for the 2005 
EMF - continue to hold in 2005 and early 2006, while some of the so called “push factors 
“ are weakening. Nevertheless, the on going structural reforms and financial innovations 
in many EME capital markets have the potential to attract strategic investors, minimize 
excessive capital flow volatility, while building efficient defenses against inevitable 
volatility that will remain. Adoption of such reforms in a broader range of countries 
would enhance the efficiency of financial globalization process. 
 
Key factors influencing the size and direction of capital inflows can be 
categorized as follows.  
 
A.  Factors affecting relative investment returns and risk–return mix.  
 
These factors include  prospects for growth, expected exchange rate changes, and 
relative yields on various instruments, taking into account corporate profitability (for 
equity instruments) and monetary policy stance (for debt instruments). So long as the 
overall macro-level indicators are promising, the issue will be one of profitability and 
  11financial soundness of actual companies they invest in. The soundness of the financial 
sector also needs to be factored in along side the purely macroeconomic indicators to 
form a view on risks to macroeconomic performance and the sustainability of returns. 
Such factoring in of financial stability considerations in country risk assessments is 
particularly important in an increasingly globalizd setting of many EMEs. In addition to 
macroeconomic and macro prudential factors, factors like earnings growth, return on 
equity, and other measures of corporate soundness and profitability are also  key 
considerations for global investors. Shifts in sovereign credit ratings, as a summary 
measure of credit risk derived from the country fundamentals and other factors, affect 
investor sentiment. 
  
In addition a range of structural factors affecting the investability in EME 
assets also play a key role. These include:  
 
•  Openness to various forms of capital flows 
•  State of development of capital markets and the related financial 
market infrastructure 
•  Structural changes in the sources of supply of capital 
 
First, a country’s policies to open up and enhance the access of foreign investors 
to the equity and debt of its companies is a necessary first step  to attract global investors 
seeking diversification and new opportunities for returns (see section 3.2 for further 
details) 
 
Second, several structural factors governing security market infrastructure play a 
critical role in shaping the perceived returns and riskiness of investing in EMC equity 
securities. These include: 
 
•  Corporate governance and transparency: The Asian financial crisis highlighted the 
crucial importance of good corporate governance, transparency of management 
and majority shareholders actions affecting companies that foreigners invest in, 
and the accuracy of financial accounts presented to the investment community. 
The creation of effective regulatory and supervisory institutions and the 
formulation of appropriate policy framework for good governance in EMCs have 
been important factors in attracting portfolio equity in particular. {{There is some 
evidence, though not a whole lot, that foreign mutual funds investments in 
emerging markets are significantly linked to security-market infrastructure, 




•  Market liquidity: This has also become an important determinant of flows of 
portfolio capital into EMC equities. Global investors typically seek investments in 
which there are significant amounts of daily trading enabling them to buy and sell 
these assets without moving the price against them and also ensuring that they can 
enter and exit these investments easily as and when they desire to.  Market 
liquidity is influenced by both the size and pattern of ownership of listed 
securities, and the microstructure of the markets, including the trading systems. 
                                                 
2 Aggarwal, Rena, Leora Klappen and Peter D. Wysocki 2003 “Portfolio Preferences of Foreign Institutional Investors” 
Policy Research Working Paper 3101, WB, Washington, D.C. July.  
  12The creation of a liquid security market with efficient trading arrangements is thus 
important to attract both domestic and foreign investment. {{There is evidence 
that equity-market liberalization, involving an opening up to foreign shareholders, 
is associated with significant increase in share prices and reduction in cost of 
capital (Henry and Lorentzen (2003) Also, more protection of shareholders is 
strongly associated with the size, efficiency and stability of equity markets (see 




•  Legal Infrastructure: While transparency, good governance and market micro-
structure are also important for developing debt markets, certain infrastructure 
components such as insolvency regimes, trust and securitization laws require 
proper attention in order to develop corporate debt markets. In addition the 
development of government securities market calls for a conducive and an 
effective framework for public debt management.    
 
•  Macro stability and Macro prudential surveillance: Several broad structural 
features that affect the macroeconomic and financial stability policy frameworks, 
such as the sustainability of exchange rate regime, the perceptions of financial 
system stability, including the debt-equity ratio of companies, public debt 
sustainability, efficiency and soundness of financial intermediation etc. will also 
shape the overall perceptions of costs, risks and returns of investing in EMCs. 
 
Third, structural changes in the sources of foreign capital can be critical. For all types 
of institutional investors in industrial countries, the share of foreign assets in their total 
portfolio is rising, reflecting a growing strategic focus of these investors on EMEs 
(Global Financial Stability Report, September 2005 and Global Development Finance 
2006).   This could reinforce the impact domestic capital market development policies in 
enhancing the depth and liquidity of local financial market.  
 
Finally, there are special factors such as privatizations, mergers, and other country or 
region specific one-off factors (e.g. initial impact of accession to EU) that influence the 
type and level of capital flows.  
 
B.  Factors affecting risk-adjusted returns  
 
The regional variations in growth and annual real exchange rate change in various 
EME regions are shown in Tables 5-6. Strong global growth and low inflation witnessed 
in 2005, despite further jumps in oil and non-oil commodity prices, are expected to 
continue in 2006, according to various official forecasts. Emerging Markets have faced 
unusually favorable external conditions, characterized by strong global demand, large 
terms of trade improvements, and easier access to external financing. These 
circumstances were reflected in strong growth, large current account surpluses, and 
moderate inflation in EMEs generally. In addition, stable or generally appreciating 
nominal or real exchange rates during in recent years –partly in response to the strong 
inflows of capital--added to the returns to foreign investors on EME assets. The number 
                                                 
3 Pietro Garibaldi, Nada Mora, Ratra Sahay, and Jeromin Zettlemeger, What Moves Capital to Transition Economies? 
In IMF Staff Papers May 2002, vol 48, Special Issue (IMF, Washington, D.C.). 
4 Peter Blair Henry and Peter Lombund Lorentzen.  “Domestic Capital Market Reform and Access to Global Finance: 
Making Markets Work.”  The Future of Domestic Capital Markets in Development Countries ed. By Robert E. Litan, 
Michael Pomerleane, and V. Sundararajan (editors)  Brookings  Institution Press(2003  Washington D.C.). 
  13of upgrades of sovereign ratings by rating agencies far exceeded number of downgrades, 
contributing to strengthened external demand for EME assets, and continued downward 
trend in credit spreads.  
 
In the presence of such strong fundamentals that led to attractive relative returns, 
the beginning of monetary tightening in the US in 2004 has had only a limited impact on 
risk perceptions. However, the synchronized tightening among industrial countries now 
underway, and the prospective adjustments in the pattern of global current account 
imbalances, all seem to pose more significant downside risks for the global economy This 
was already evident in the second quarter of 2006, when global financial markets 
experienced increased volatility and a sharp correction in the price of riskier assets. Some 
emerging market asset prices declined sharply, particularly in some of the more liquid 
local equity markets and in those currency markets that had appreciated the most. In Debt 
markets, however, there was only a slight upward adjustment in the credit spreads, which 
have been at historic lows already. Thus the impact of recent turbulence seems well 
contained and transitory (See Box 1 on the next page for a further discussion of 
turbulence in emerging markets.) 
 
Emerging markets in particular are expected to sustain the robust growth achieved 
in 2005, current account surpluses are expected to be broadly maintained, with an 
increase particularly in the Middle East region on account of oil price increases, and 
inflation is expected to remain moderate in most EMEs. The relatively subdued reaction 
of inflation sofar to commodity price shocks, the greater role of EMEs in sustaining 
global demand, and generally favorable financial conditions of the corporate sector, both 
financial and non-financial, are some of the factors that would contribute to continued 
strong macroeconomic performance globally and in EMEs in 2006.  
 
    The EME performance has also benefited from improvements in the financial 
soundness of both banks and non banks (BIS (2006), GFSR (April 2006). Banking 
systems in EMEs have generally strengthened overall (in terms indicators such as Capital 
adequacy ratios, ratio of non-performing loans, etc.) as a result of economic recovery and 
reforms, while debt –equity ratios of non- financial firms has declined. Capacity for 
making macroeconomic and financial policy adjustments in response to various shocks 
impacting on the financial system has improved in many EMEs, which have built up their 
macro -prudential surveillance capabilities. {As an indicator of their capacity for macro 
prudential surveillance, 24 emerging and developing countries have started, over the last 
few years, issuing Financial Stability Reports to complement their monetary policy 
related reports}. 
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Box 1: Global Imbalances, Risk Aversion, and Recent Turbulence in Emerging 
Markets 
 
While emerging market fundamentals and demand for EME assets remain 
strong, the effects of concerted monetary tightening in industrial countries on the 
demand for EME assets remain unclear. Also the recent sell off by global investors, 
which affected some EME markets particularly sharply, has raised the issue whether 
this presages a generalized risk aversion leading to outflows of portfolio investment, or 
simply reflects transitory one-off adjustments in relative risk exposures.  
 
An increase in risk aversion due to the perceived risks –uncertainty and shifts 
in inflation and exchange rate expectations, and possibly lower growth and corporate 
profitability, owing to possible downturn in economic activity in countries where 
monetary policy is tightening—could raise risk premiums, affect investor positioning 
in specific markets where investors feel over exposed. At the same time, large terms of 
trade improvements and continued moderate inflation in most EMEs may help to 
sustain strong growth and continued strong fundamentals overall. 
 
The sell-off by global investors in the spring of 2006 was concentrated in local 
emerging markets, particularly equities and currencies, and to a limited extent in local 
currency debt markets; some of the EME equity prices that had risen sharply in 2005 
witnessed sharp declines. Some of the higher yielding currencies that had been favored 
by investors for carry trades saw significant sell off (IMF (2006b.)This helped to 
reverse the sharp nominal and real appreciations in these currencies in 2005.A sell-off 
of portfolio local currency debt partly reversed the significant inflow into local 
currency debt markets in 2005, with sharp corrections in prices. 
 
The evidence presented in IMF (2006b) and BIS (2006), suggest that the recent 
sell off in emerging market capital markets was modest relative to large inflows that 
had already occurred, and that recent increase in emerging market spread was small 
relative to the pronounced declines in spread that occurred since 2002. [Table on EME 
stock price increases in selected countries]. A recent analysis of the determinants of 
EME debt market spreads examines the time series evolution of spreads as a function 
of country fundamentals (measured by various country risk ratings) and external 
perceptions of global financial risk (measured by 3-month future Fed funds rate and its 
volatility). The analysis suggests that the EME spreads are well anchored in 
fundamentals, and that even sizeable increases in global risk may offset only slightly 
the reductions in the spread so far due to country fundamentals. This finding, 
combined with the evidence of significant structural improvements in local currency 
debt markets (see section – of text), including public debt management framework, 
and the prospects for continuation of strong fundamentals, all seem to suggest that the 
recent turbulence seems a one-off adjustment rather than a precursor of global risk 
aversion.    
  15In the future, perceptions of risks in EME investments could increase due to the 
uncertainties associated with the policy adjustments and market reactions to the current 
and prospective global imbalances (and the associated shifts in inflation and exchange 
rate expectation). Nevertheless, the strength of fundamentals in many EMEs, and the 
recent structural changes in the EME capital markets, together have the potential to 
stabilize the capital inflows to the EMEs with strong fundamentals.  
 
In summery, the prospective continuation of strong fundamentals in EMEs could 
serve to maintain broadly the risk adjusted returns on EME assets at attractive levels seen 
in recent past, and thereby sustain the foreign investor appetite for these assets. 
 
B.  Structural and special factors affecting Investibility and Capital Flows 
 
While the continued strength of macro economic fundamentals in EMEs clearly 
played a role in shaping the expected returns and perceptions of risk in all forms of EME 
assets, a range of structural forces have also been in play in shaping the demand for 
different categories of private capital inflows.  
 
A large number of countries have opened up their capital markets to foreign 
investors during the last decade, both by allowing access of residents to foreign financial 
markets, and by strengthening access of non-residents to domestic financial markets. As 
noted in Miniane (2004), the degree of capital account restrictions have been eased 
substantially, though at varying paces, in a wide range of countries during 1985-2000. 
The trend toward greater openness seems to continue as highlighted in AREAER (2005) 
For example, in addition to relaxing non resident’s access to local money and securities 
markets, several countries have eased access of residents to foreign securities as part of 
policies to cope with strong inflows..  These developments have allowed for a greater 
competition among countries for foreign investments, and contributed to a reduction in 
concentration of capital inflows among countries noted earlier. 
 
The local equity and debt markets have developed significantly in many EMEs on 
account of a range of structural reforms and supportive macroeconomic environment. 
Various measures of market development -- such as market capitalization to GDP ratio, 
bonds outstanding to GDP ratio, and stock market turnover -- have improved over the 
past decade. Although markets in many EMEs remain shallow, requiring further 
institutional development, overall EME equity markets have provided attractive 
opportunities for risk diversification (GFSR, June 2002) to global investors. The on-going 
innovations and reforms in local and international debt markets for EMEs   have also 
provided risk diversification opportunities (BIS 2006). Some of these innovations such as 
growing use of credit derivatives, strengthened public debt management arrangements, 
innovations in structured finance to design Islamic fixed income securities (see Box 2), all 
have raised the attractiveness of EME debt.  
 
Portfolio equity inflows benefited in particular from expanded investor base, 
including a growing presence of retail investors through emerging market stock funds, in 
addition to strong growth in valuations (with emerging market stock prices performing 
exceptionally well during the past three years) As a result, both international equity 
placements by EME issuers, as well as foreign investment in local stock markets, 
performed well. A significant part of equity issues during 2005 was driven by IPO’s, 
notably in China (World Bank (2006)). 
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Strong growth and reduced volatility of portfolio debt inflows into EMEs was 
attributable to the cumulative impact of a variety of structural factors affecting EME debt 
markets. These include: 1) Growth in euro market for EME debt; 2); Growth in credit 
derivatives applied to EME debt, allowing better risk diversification, and hence stronger 
demand (and finer pricing) for EME debt; and 3); Strengthened institutional arrangements 
for more active and effective public debt management, facilitated by a deepening of local 
currency debt markets and a widening of investor base for EME bonds. 
 
Strengthened Public Debt Management policies and structural demand from 
foreign investors have contributed to resilient markets for EME debt. For examples, 
several EMEs have reduced currency mismatches and lengthened the maturities by 
strengthening local currency debt markets. Such markets have thus evolved into a major 
source of long-term finance in many EMEs.  
 
In addition, a rise in allocations to EME assets by institutional investors in 
developed countries (Pension Funds, Insurance Companies, and Mutual Funds) has 
contributed added depth and liquidity to many Emerging markets Active debt 
management to achieve desired tradeoffs between cost and risks has played a key role in 
shaping the portfolio debt inflows. The specific measures to manage the trade offs 
included: debt buy backs, pre-financing of borrowing needs to take advantage of liquid 
markets, and quick actions to stabilize the markets when markets faced selling pressures. 
These factors have improved the debt dynamics and contributed to reducing the spreads 
on EME debt.  
 
Bank financing inflows to EMEs, mainly syndicated bank lending, was 
dominated by oil and gas projects and oil import financing. The strong growth recorded 
inflows of syndicated bank lending in some countries, noted in GDF 2006, being offset by 
outflows of bank financing from EMEs in many countries. 
 
           FDI inflows, which last year accounted for US$316 billion or 64% of total private 
capital inflows to EMEs (compared to US167 billion in 2003), appear to be driven by a 
combination of traditional and new factors. The macro-economic and structural reforms 
as well as efforts of many countries to enhance private sector role in the economies have 
made the countries much more attractive to international companies; these companies are 
often investing large amounts to catch up. In high growth countries with large domestic 
markets – China, India, Russia, Brazil – the multinational companies are increasing their 
exposure to exploit market opportunities; indeed, many multinational companies realize 
that to remain a major global player they can not afford not to be present in fast growing 
EMEs, particularly the so called BRICs. In addition, most multinationals are investing in 
EMEs to source products at lower costs. Unlike the past, such investments now often go 
beyond investments in plants and include mergers and acquisitions of existing domestic 
players. And, finally, since the recent sharp rise in commodity prices, there has been a 
surge in investments in resource rich countries EMEs and other developing countries.  
 
V. Summary and Issues For Discussion 
 
Surge in private capital flows to emerging markets, particularly since 2002/2003 
continued in 2005, but some of the factors that led to the buoyancy of capital flows have 
been in retreat in recent months. The synchronized tightening of monetary policy in 
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have led to a cyclical build up of risk aversion and inflation expectations. Despite recent 
turbulence, both portfolio equity flows, and foreign direct investment seems to have risen 
in 2006, but private debt inflows may have declined somewhat in 2006 from a peak level 
reached in 2005.  This reflected in part pre-financing by many sovereign and private 
borrowers in 2005 and early 2006 in anticipation of a future tightening of liquidity 
conditions in the financial markets. 
 
Recent developments highlight several key issues in managing capital flows:  
 
1.  Despite the buoyancy of capital inflows on account of the favorable 
combination of sound macro economic performance, unusually accomodative 
monetary policies in major OECD economies, strengthened terms of trade, and 
strong demand for EME assets, portfolio flows remain volatile as seen in the 
recent sell-off of equity positions in emerging markets. Nevertheless, the 
changes in debt management practices and greater depth and resilience of 
local debt and equity markets seemed to have limited market volatility. In 
particular, debt market volatility seems to have fallen relative to what was 
observed in recent years.  Bank financing continues to remain volatile. These 
observations in turn point to two key issues: 
 
•  What are the likely consequences of the potential unwinding of global 
imbalances on the size and volatility of private capital inflows to 
emerging markets? What are the likely implications for financial 
soundness, macro economic stability and economic growth in EMEs?  
•  Does the recent turbulence and sell-off in emerging markets reflect 
one-off adjustments in relative risk exposures or presage more 
fundamental shift in risk perceptions generally on account of global 
uncertainties? 
•  Do emerging markets have adequate macro-prudential surveillance 
framework to monitor adequately the impact of global imbalances and 
of the shifts in capital flows on domestic financial soundness? 
 
2.  The continued strong growth in FDI in 2004 and 2005 was accompanied by 
some diversification of FDI among regions.  FDI expanded strongly in 
resource rich countries, which benefited from energy and commodity price 
increases, in some European countries, which benefited from the improved 
investment opportunities and confidence deriving from the initial impact EU 
accession, and in Africa due to two large acquisitions in South Africa. Thus a 
lot of FDI flow in these regions seems related to special circumstances, FDI 
remains concentrated in Asia, and regional differences remain important. East 
Asia, in particular China, continues to dominate.  
 
•  What are the lessons of recent experience for the strategy to 
improve and broaden access to FDI inflows? 
 
3.  There is evidence that appropriate structural reforms to develop domestic 
financial markets can promote stable capital flows to finance long-term 
growth, and limit the impact of volatility on financial soundness: This 
observation raises several issues:  
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•  What is the appropriate scope and sequencing of reforms to build 
domestic capital markets? 
•  Can capital market development strategies with an emphasis on asset 
securitization facilitate private finance of infrastructure development, 
which is a critical need in many emerging markets?  
•  As the share of strategic investors grows, how could countries position 
themselves to attract larger shares or retain their relative shares?  
•  What are the implications of growing importance of local currency 
debt markets for the relative shares of debt inflows to EMEs? 
 
4.  While private capital flows have been characterized by substantial 
concentrations by regions and countries, recent shifts in the structure of global 
imbalances due to oil price increases may have implications for the type and 
patterns of capital flows. In particular, the growing surpluses of oil exporting 
countries particularly in the Middle East seems to have led to increased 
demand for Islamic securities, a form of structured finance transaction linked 
to ownership in tangible assets and equity claims, as a means to finance 
infrastructure and sovereign financing needs. However, egal and institutional 
infrastructure for Islamic finance is still evolving. (See Box 2 on next page for 
a discussion of Islamic securities)  
 
•  Would the sovereigns and firms issuing such securities play a key role 
in recycling oil surpluses?  





  19Box 2:  Middle East Surpluses and Islamic Securities 
Recent analysis of financial market implications of growing surpluses in the middle-east 
region - on account of energy price increases - conclude that current concentration of investments 
of oil funds in dollar assets, particularly offshore dollar bank deposits, could continue and only a 
slow diversification into other as set classes, including those denominated in other currencies, is 
likely to take place (IMF (2006) a Global Financial Stability Report).  
The importance of Islamic Finance, particularly in the countries of the middle -east raises 
the issue of whether the increase in oil surpluses could spur the demand for Islamic securities and 
Islamic investment products generally, and whether such securities could become a source of 
diversification for the investments of petrodollars.  
Islamic financial instruments are financial contracts issued in accordance with the 
principles of Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence (Shariah principles).  Some of the key principles 
include: prohibition of interest, sharing of risks to justify return, not incurring “avoidable” or 
“excessive” risks, avoidance of financial support to products and activities prohibited by Islam, 
transparency of contracts, etc…. Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services (IIFS) typically 
employ a Shariah Board of Shariah scholars to seek ex -ante approval for the products and services 
to be offered in order to provide assurances that these are Shariah-compliant.  The opinions/ 
rulings (also referred to as fatwas) of Shariah Boards are further reviewed (and subject to 
approval) by a National Shariah Board in some jurisdictions (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia), and are 
left to market forces in others (Saudi Arabia, Dubai).  Regardless of the institutional arrangements 
for the harmonization and implementation of Shariah rulings and standards, banking regulators 
will typically oversee the adequacy of the systems and controls in an IIFS to ensure Shariah 
compliance.  
Consistent with the Shariah principles, Islamic finance instruments are either equity-like 
(based on various forms of profit sharing contracts, including partnership arrangements) or asset-
based (based on purchases and resale of goods, ownership and leasing of assets, or forward 
purchases of goods for delivery, etc.)  A range of Islamic investment products, such a non tradable 
Profit Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIA)--based on profit sharing and loss -bearing contracts, 
known as Mudarabha --provided by IIFS, or tradable equity securities and mutual funds that meet 
specified screening criteria set up by Shariah boards, have existed for a long time. PSIA are fixed 
term products which provide returns linked to the profits of the overall asset portfolio of the IIFS 
(Unrestricted PSIA) or to a specific investment portfolio (Restricted PSIA). These are in principle 
similar to mutual funds, but are not tradable, and constitutue a significant source of funding for 
Islamic banks.  The size and share of Shariah compliant stocks have also grown rapidly in recent 
years.  A large number of indexes —currently more than 40 under the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Indexes (DJIMI) umbrella, and several indexes under the FTSE Global Islamic Index Series—are 
available to monitor Shariah compliant stocks in many jurisdictions.  Globally, nearly 250 Islamic 
mutual funds operate managing about $_300 billion in assets.  However the availability of globally 
acceptable fixed income securities consistent with Shariah principle (known as Sukuks, or Islamic 
Bonds) is more recent (IOSCO (2004)).  In particular, design of Shariah-compatible short-term 
(money market) securities or government securities that yield a fixed income stream has been a 
major challenge in Islamic finance, owing to the Shariah prohibition of trading in debt; and this 
has constrained liquidity risk management by IIFS and liquidity management by central banks in 
jurisdictions with significant presence of IIFS.  
20 Recent innovations in Islamic Asset securitization have begun to overcome these 
limitations and the issuance of Islamic fixed income securities (known as sukuks) particularly for 
project financing, has accelerated in recent years.  Historically, many governments, notably 
Malaysia and Bahrain, have promoted Islamic bonds in their national jurisdictions.  However, 
issuance of globally acceptable Islamic bonds has gathered momentum particularly since 2001, 
when IDB, and some national governments began securitizing Islamic contracts, particularly lease 
contracts (known as Ijara contracts).  
Islamic Bonds or Sukuks are “trust certificates” or”participation certificates” that grant  
an investor a share of an asset along with the cashflows and risks commeneurate with such  
ownership. Sukuks represent “certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in  
ownership of tangible assets, usurfruct, and services, or (in the ownership of assets of particular 
projects or special investment activity….”  AAOIFI, Shariah Standard No. 17). Sukuks are 
classified according to the underlying Islamic contracts that underpin the securitization (I Jara 
Sukuk, Musharakha Sukuk, etc…). Issuance of Sukuk involvs creation of a Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPVs)) to own , service and operate specified assets, issue Sukuks, pass on the proceeds 
to the originator and enter into income generating contracts using the assets (e.g. leasing or 
trading, building and operating, etc…).  Thus, ideally Sukuk issuance requires strong secured asset 
laws and trust laws to ensure true sale and bankruptcy remoteness of SPV in order to safeguard 
investor interests. In practice most Sukuks until recently have involved “purchase undertaking 
agreements “by the originator, so that the underlying risks are related to the credit rating of the 
originator, rather than the quality of the underlying assets and SPV governance. (Moody (2006)).  
Recent developments in global issuance of Sukuks, many issued for financing infrastructure 
projects are shown in the chart below.  This includes one of the largest issues  -  $3.5 billion - by 
Dubai Ports World to finance capital expenditures.  The strong growth in issue activity in the gulf 
region reflects both the boom in business investment and the availability of savings on account of 
energy price increases (Financial Times, July 11, 2006, P 17).  Reported Sukuk Issues in the first 
half of the year was about $12 billion, almost five times the $2.6 billion closed in the same period 
of 2005.  While Malaysia remained the leading issuer, issue activities vy Gulf countries including 
Bahrain, CAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia seem to be taking off.  The innovations in Islamic 
finance, thus, augur well for efficient recycling of petrodollars.  
 
 
Source: Liquidity Management Center, www.lmcbahrain.com ,lists a total of 77 issues since 
September 20021, with a current  outstanding value of about 18 billion.  Adding staff estimates 
for issues in the remainder of 2006, total outstanding could rise to about $36 billion, mainly on 
account of what appears to be a huge surge in issuance in 2006. 
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List of Emerging Market Countries 
 
  There is some debate as to how to define emerging market economies and 
therefore which countries should be included in any list of EMCs.  For purposes of this 
paper, we have used a relatively broad definition to include countries which are both of 
most interest to international investors at this time and which compete with each other in 
attracting international private capital flows.  The list we have chosen corresponds to the 
list and definitions of EMCs used by international investors and also by journals such as 
the Economist.  While most of these countries are middle or upper middle countries 
developing countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America, we also include come low 
middle income and low income countries (e.g. China, India, Vietnam, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Bolivia etc.) which are capable of attracting significant capital flows as well as the so 
called “tiger” countries in Asia spawned the original club of the EMCs and whose 
economic policies are both emulated in and intertwined with the rest of Emerging Asia 
 
Latin  America    Europe   Middle  East 
Argentina     Bulgaria    Egypt 
Bolivia      Croatia     Thailand 
Brazil      Czech  Republic   Behrain 
Chile      Hungary    Iran 
Colombia     Poland     Israel 
Costa  Rica     Romania    Jordan 
E c u a d o r      R u s s i a      K u w a i t  
Mexico    Serbia  and  Montenegro  Saudi  Arabia 
Peru      Slovak  Republic   United  Arab  Emirates 
Uruguay     Turkey 
Venezuela     Ukraine 
 
A s i a       A f r i c a  
Bangladesh     Algeria 
China      Morocco 
Hong Kong, China      Tunisia 
India      Cote  d’Ivoire 
Indonesia     Ghana 
Korea,  Rep.     Kenya 
Malaysia     Nigeria 
Pakistan     South  Africa 
Philippines     Uganda 
Singapore        
S r i   L a n k a         
Taiwan (China) 
Vietnam 
K a z a k h s t a n         
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Data Sources & Definitions 
 
1.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows are taken from line 78 bed of IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) yearbook (various issues); It is referred to 
in IFS tables as “Direct Investment in Representative Economy, not included 
elsewhere (nie)”, and represents increase in net inward investment by non-
residents and includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and 
financial derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions between 
affiliated enterprises. 
 
2.  Portfolio Debt net inflows is taken from line 78 bnd of IMF, IFS yearbook 
(various issus)”. It is refereed to in IFS tables as “portfolio investment liabilities 
,nie, debt securities” and covers nonresident purchases of bonds, debentures, 
notes, etc… and money market and negotiable debt investments. 
 
3.  Portfolio Equity net inflows is taken from line 78 bmd. Of IMF, IFS yearbook 
(various issues); It is referred to in IFS tables as ”portfolio investment liabilities, 
n.i.e., equity securities” and covers non-resident acquisition of chares, stocks, 
participation and similar documents (e.g. depository receipts) that usually denote 
ownership of equity. 
 
4.  Net Bank financing  is calculated  as the sum of line 78 bud (other investment 
liabilities, n.i.e., banks) and line 78 bqd (other investment assets, n.i.e., banks) and 
represents transactions with non-residents in currency, and deposits, bonds, and 
trade credits through the banking system. 
 
 
5.  Data for 2005 are staff estimates based on partial quarterly data reported in IFS 
and country publications. 
 
6.  Data reported here differ from other commonly cited sources- World Bank’s 
Global Development Finance, IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report and World 
Economic Outlook --due to 
¾  differences in country coverage 
a.  differences in the definitions and sources used in 
compiling portfolio debt and bank inflows.  
        
For example, data in portfolio debt based on IFS definition in this document roughly 
corresponds to net bond financing data used in World Bank’s GDF (DT.NFL.PBND.CD, 
DT.NFL.PNGB.CD).  For Bank inflows, we use net inflows from Banks plus net 
outflows to Banks as defined in IFS.  As our list of EMEs include major financial centers, 
there can be massive recorded inflows that are offset by large outflows reflecting 
international inter bank activity.  Therefore net figures are used to avoid distortions in 
measuring the true extent of inflows through the banking system.  That is, resident 
outflows through the banking system are also deducted from net inflows, in addition to on 
lending and carry trade activities; As a result, net figures tend to be lower than the 
syndicated bank lending and other long-term net lending reported in GDF 
(DT.NFL.PCBK.CD, DT.NFL.PNGC.CD). 
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  24Table 5: Average Weighed Annual GDP Growth Rates 
 
Weighed Av An Real GDP 
Growth Rates  91-96 97-98 99-04 
2005-2007 
(projected) 
Africa  2.0% 2.5% 3.5%  4.8% 
Americas  3.5% 4.0% 1.9%  4.1% 
Asia  8.1% 3.4% 6.8%  7.5% 
Europe  -2.9% 1.8% 4.4%  4.9% 
Middle East  5.3% 3.7% 3.9%  5.7% 
Total EMF  4.3% 3.3% 4.7%  6.1% 
 
Source: WB's WDI and IMF's WEO. 
Taiwan excluded, Serbia no data 1990-1992, and Kuwait no data 1990-1991. 
 
 
Table 6: Real Effective Exchange Rate (Weighed by GDP) 
 
 
Weighed REER  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Africa  114.1 112.7 119.8 118.8 104.1 100.0 96.9 90.4 96.3  101.2 103.7
Americas  97.1 98.3  105.4 106.1 102.0 100.0 102.2 95.2 87.8 88.5 92.2
Asia  93.8 100.6 105.0 105.5 100.7 100.0 103.2 101.3 95.0 92.5 92.7
Europe  99.7 115.1 123.5 112.7 93.2 100.0 113.6 115.8 114.8 121.6 132.4
Middle East  93.4 95.9  100.3 102.1 97.5 100.0 100.8 95.7 88.7 83.1 81.3
EM Total  98.1 105.2 111.0 108.4 99.3 100.0 104.6 102.8 99.0  100.0 103.9
 




Table 7:  Foreign Direct Investment by Region 1990-2005 
 
FDI (bn$)  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004 2005
Africa  0.9 1.5 1.6 2.7  3.7 3.2 3.2 6.7 3.5 4.1 4.2 10.8 5.1 6.8 5.4 13.7
Americas  7.3 11.9 13.6 12.5  27.0 28.8 42.5 62.8 68.3 83.6 75.3 66.4 46.5 37.5 56.5 62.4
Asia  21.1 21.1 28.9 51.8  63.3 73.0 86.5 97.5 89.4 108.1 141.9 102.4 85.3 87.4 136.5 165.7
Europe  0.8 2.7 3.1 5.8  6.2 15.1 14.3 19.1 21.9 25.2 26.6 25.4 28.2 26.6 53.2 65.6
Middle East  2.6 1.4 1.9 2.2  2.3 0.5 3.3 6.3 7.7 4.1 6.1 5.4 5.6 8.7 14.1 8.3
                                                  
EM  Total  32.7 38.5 49.1 75.0  102.5 120.6 149.8 192.4 190.9 225.1 254.1 210.5  170.7 167.0 265.7 315.7
 
Sources: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, Singapore 
Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates.
  25Table 8: Portfolio Capital Inflows (Debt Plus Equity) by Region 1990-2005 
 
TotPort In (bn$) 1990  1991 1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003 2004 2005
Africa  0.1 0.6 3.8 0.8 3.1 2.9 4.5 11.4 9.9 13.8 1.8 -3.0 0.5 1.0 7.7 5.8
Americas  21.2 25.4 30.3 79.9 70.8 6.4 50.4 33.1 32.7 15.7 0.0 1.0 -9.6  4.5 -4.5 18.3
Asia  0.8 4.3 9.3  29.0  28.1 29.8 45.7 25.1 -1.8 90.2 73.0 25.9 13.8 77.8 78.8 111.5
Europe  0.7 0.7 3.2  10.7 4.7 5.1 7.9 24.6 5.6 5.7 -5.9 -0.5 9.8 10.4 39.4 37.2
Middle East  0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.9 2.0 2.5 0.1 2.2 5.1 1.8 0.8 1.3 4.0 4.8
                                                  
EM Total  23.4  31.3 46.8  120.7  107.1 45.1 110.5 96.8 46.5 127.6 74.0 25.2  15.3 94.9 125.4 177.8
 
Sources: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. 
of Statistics, CEIC, & Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 9: Portfolio Equity Inflow by Region, 1990-2005 
 
Equity In (bn$)  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004 2005
Africa  0.4 -1.4 -0.1  0.9  0.3 3.0 2.5 5.6 8.7 9.0 4.2 -1.0 -0.4  0.7  7.3 7.0
Americas  2.5 6.9 8.2  24.0  18.4 5.2 12.1 14.3 -2.2 -3.6 -0.6 2.5 1.4 3.3  -0.6 12.3
Asia  1.3 0.6 5.6  17.6  13.7 11.4 18.0 6.9 0.6 95.0 76.4 25.3 10.1 67.4 56.0 93.4
Europe  0.1 0.1 0.4 2.2 1.9 1.6 4.1 3.8 3.9 1.7 1.2 0.2 -0.3  0.3  5.8 5.7
Middle East  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.4 2.2 0.3 2.2 4.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 3.6 4.2
                                                  
EM Total  4.3  6.3  14.0  45.1  34.7 22.2 38.2 32.8 11.4 104.2 85.8 27.4  11.5 72.4 72.1 122.7
 
Sources: IMF's IFS. To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., 
& Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 10:  Portfolio Debt by Region, 1990-2005 
 
Debt In (bn$)  1990  1991 1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004 2005
Africa  -0.2 2.0 3.9  -0.2 2.8 0.0 2.0 5.8 1.2 4.8 -2.4 -2.0 0.9 0.2 0.4 -1.2
Americas  18.7 18.5 22.1 55.9 52.4 1.2 38.3 18.8 34.8 19.4 0.6 -1.5 -11.1  1.2  -3.9 6.0
Asia  -0.5 3.7 3.7  11.3  14.4 18.4 27.7 18.3 -2.4 -3.9 -1.3 1.3 3.7  10.4  22.8 18.1
Europe  0.6 0.6 2.8 8.5 2.8 3.5 3.7 20.8 1.7 4.1 -7.1 -0.7 10.1 10.1 33.5 31.5
Middle East  0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 1.3
                                                  
EM  Total  19.1 24.9 32.8 75.6 72.4 22.9 72.3 64.0 35.1 24.3 -9.7 -1.6 3.9  22.6 53.3 55.7
 
Sources: IMF's IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & Indonesia's central banks, CEIC, & Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998.
  26Table 11:  Net Flow of Bank Financing by Region, 1990-2005 
 
Banks (bn$)  1990  1991 1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003  2004 2005
Africa  0.0 -0.8 -1.4 -0.7  0.4 2.8 0.0 -1.0 -0.6 -3.8 1.4 -2.6 -3.7 -8.6 -1.4 -0.5
Americas  4.1 2.1 5.3  -3.2  -3.1 3.8 -2.0 9.1 -6.9 -12.5 0.5 -11.9 4.0  -4.9  -0.7 -11.1
Asia  -3.6 7.1 9.4  10.3 9.7 15.8 10.8 -23.3 -76.6 -76.8 -68.5 27.0  31.6 3.4  42.2 -14.2
Europe  -5.4 -4.1 -0.6  1.1 -8.1 14.5 8.6 5.2 -0.7 -6.0 -5.3 -16.9  12.7 25.7  1.5 30.3
Middle East  -3.5 -1.1 8.3  3.7  3.5 -1.4 -4.7 16.1 7.5 2.0 -2.8 4.0 1.6 1.7  -9.6 -2.5
                                                  
EM Total  -8.5  3.1 21.1  11.3 2.4 35.4 12.6 6.0 -77.4 -97.0 -74.6 -0.5 46.2 17.3 32.1 2.0
 
Sources: IMF's IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's Central Bank, the Singapore Dept. of Statistics, & CEIC. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 12:  Total FDI Inflows into EMEs 
Top 10 Countries 
     
FDI 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
China, P.R.: Mainland  34.8 China, P.R.: Mainland  67.0 
Mexico  10.2 China, P.R.: Hong Kong  35.0 
Singapore 10.1 Singapore 18.6 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  7.0  Mexico  18.0 
Argentina 4.6  Brazil  16.7 
Malaysia 4.3  Russia 15.0 
Brazil 4.0  Poland  10.3 
Indonesia 3.2  United  Arab  Emirates  10.0 
Hungary 3.0  Czech  Republic  8.0 
Peru 2.9 Chile 7.2 
 
Source: IMF's IFS.  
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's Central Bank, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., 
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Table 13:  Total Portfolio Inflows into EMEs 
Top 10 Countries 
     
Total Portfolio 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
Brazil 29.0 Taiwan,  China  24.1 
Korea 11.7 China,  P.R.:  Mainland  17.2 
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  8.9 Korea  16.1 
Argentina 8.1 Poland  12.9 
Indonesia 4.0 Turkey  12.0 
India 3.5 India  10.9 
Thailand 3.4 Mexico  8.1 
South Africa  2.9 Malaysia  7.2 
Taiwan, China   2.8 Hungary  6.5 
Hungary  2.3 China, P.R.: Hong Kong  6.5 
 
For Hong Kong, 1993 data used for 1994-1995. 
Source: IMF's IFS.  
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
IMF Country Report 96/29, & Centennial Estimates. 
 
 
Table 13a:  Debt Inflows Inflows into EMEs 
Top 10 Countries 
      
Debt 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
Brazil 24.0 Poland  11.4 
Korea 7.7  Korea  9.8 
Argentina 5.2  Turkey  8.5 
Thailand 2.4  Mexico  7.7 
China, P.R.: Mainland  2.3  Hungary  5.8 
Indonesia 2.3  Malaysia  4.7 
Hungary 2.3  Czech  Republic  2.8 
Philippines 1.8  Ukraine  2.4 
South Africa  1.4  Indonesia  2.2 
Taiwan, China  1.0  Russia  1.8 
 
Hong Kong excluded for 1994-1995. 
Source: IMF's IFS. 
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Table 13b:  Equity Inflows into EMEs 
Top 10 Countries 
      
Equity 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
Brazil 5  Taiwan,  China  24.5 
Korea 3.9 China,  P.R.:  Mainland  15.6 
India 3.5 India  10.9 
Argentina 2.9 South  Africa  6.8 
Mexico  2.3 China, P.R.: Hong Kong  6.4 
Taiwan, China  1.8 Korea  6.3 
Indonesia 1.7 Brazil  4.3 
South Africa  1.5 Israel  3.7 
Thailand 0.9 Turkey  3.5 
Czech Republic  0.9 Singapore  3.5 
 
Hong Kong excluded for 1994-1995. 
Sources: IMF's IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., & Centennial 
Estimates. 
 
Table 14:  Net Banks Flows into EMEs 
Top 10 Countries 
      
Net Banks 
1994-1995    2004-2005   
Thailand  11.9 China, P.R.: Hong Kong  6.9 
Singapore 3.1  India  6.8 
Russia 2.5  Russia  6.5 
Korea 2.2  Turkey  5.7 
Saudi Arabia  2.1  Hungary  3.3 
Czech Republic  1.9  Bahrain  3.2 
Argentina 1.7  Romania  3.1 
South Africa  1.7  Kazakhstan  2.3 
Philippines 1.7  Croatia  2 
Indonesia 1.2  Taiwan,  China  1.6 
 
For Hong Kong, 1993 data used for 1994-1995. 
Source: IMF's IFS 
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Table 15: Total Capital Inflows, Long Term Trend 
 
Total Capital Inflows, Av.  85-90  91-96  97-98  99-04  2005 
Africa 0.6 5.3 15.0 6.6 19.0 
Americas 6.1 67.0 99.5 57.9 69.6 
Asia 14.6 89.0 55.2 163.3 263.0 
Europe -3.4 15.1 37.8 42.6 133.2 
Middle East  -1.9 4.0 20.1 9.4 21.5 
Total EMF  16.1 180.5 227.6 279.8 506.3 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Stats, CEIC, 
IMF's BoP, WB's Gl. Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Est. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
 
 
Table 16: Total Capital Inflows, Long Term Trend 
 
Total Capital % GDP, Av.  85-90  91-96  97-98  99-04  2005 
Africa 0.26% 1.86% 4.73% 1.85% 3.30% 
Americas 0.76% 4.75% 5.23% 3.34% 3.07% 
Asia 1.25% 3.98% 1.86% 4.34% 4.85% 
Europe -0.69% 1.65% 3.97% 3.98% 6.73% 
Middle East  -0.49% 1.02% 3.72% 1.42% 2.25% 
Total EMF  0.52% 3.44% 3.41% 3.69% 4.52% 
 
Sources:  IMF's IFS and WB's WDI. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Stats, CEIC, 
IMF's BoP, WB's Gl. Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, IMF's WEO, & Centennial Est. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
 
 
Table 17: Capital Inflows By Type, Long Term Trend 
 
By Type, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
FDI 22.2 89.2 191.6 215.5 315.7 
Tot Portfolio  4.9 76.9 71.6 77.1 177.8 
Equity 1.1 26.8 22.1 62.2 122.7 
Debt 3.9 50.2 49.5 15.5 55.7 
Banks (Net)  -11.2 14.3 -35.7 -12.8 2.0 
Total Capital Inflows 15.9 180.5 227.6 279.8 495.4 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. 




  30Table 18: Capital Inflows By Type, Long Term Trend, Period Averages, % of GDP 
 
By Type % GDP, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
FDI 0.72% 1.70% 2.87% 2.84% 2.82% 
Tot Portfolio  0.16% 1.47% 1.07% 1.02% 1.59% 
Equity 0.03% 0.51% 0.33% 0.82% 1.10% 
Debt 0.13% 0.96% 0.74% 0.20% 0.50% 
Banks (Net)  -0.36% 0.27% -0.53% -0.17% 0.02% 
Total Capital Inflows 0.52% 3.44% 3.41% 3.69% 4.42% 
 
Sources:  IMF’s IFS and WB’s WDI 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
WB's Global Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, IMF's WEO, & Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998, save FDI. 
 
 
Table 19: Foreign Direct Investment, Long Term Trend, Period Averages 
 
FDI, av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa 0.8 2.7 5.1 6.1 13.7 
Americas 6.0 22.7 65.6 61.0 62.4 
Asia 13.4 54.1 93.5 110.3 165.7 
Europe 0.4 7.9 20.5 30.9 65.6 
Middle East  1.5 1.9 7.0 7.3 19.2 
Total EMF  22.2 89.2 191.6 215.5 326.6 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, WB's Global 
Dev. Fin., UNCTAD, & Centennial Estimates. 
 
 
Table 20: Foreign Direct Investment, Long Term Trend,  
Period Averages, by % GDP 
 
FDI % GDP, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa 0.34% 0.93% 1.61% 1.70% 2.38% 
Americas 0.76% 1.61% 3.45% 3.52% 2.75% 
Asia 1.15% 2.42% 3.16% 2.93% 3.06% 
Europe 0.08% 0.86% 2.15% 2.88% 3.31% 
Middle East  0.40% 0.49% 1.30% 1.12% 2.01% 
Total EMF  0.72% 1.70% 2.87% 2.84% 2.92% 
 
Sources:  IMF's IFS and WB's WDI.  
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, WB's Global 





  31Table 21: Total Portfolio Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages 
 
TotPort, av  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.4 2.6 10.6 3.6 5.8 
Americas 2.6 43.9 32.9 1.2 18.3 
Asia 2.0 24.4 11.7 59.9 111.5 
Europe 0.6 5.4 15.1 9.8 37.2 
Middle East  0.0 0.7 1.3 2.5 4.8 
Total EMF  4.9 76.9 71.6 77.1 177.8 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
& Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 22: Total Portfolio Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages, by % GDP 
 
TotPort % GDP, av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.15% 0.92% 3.36% 1.02% 1.01% 
Americas 0.32% 3.11% 1.73% 0.07% 0.81% 
Asia 0.18% 1.09% 0.39% 1.59% 2.06% 
Europe 0.13% 0.58% 1.58% 0.92% 1.88% 
Middle East  0.01% 0.18% 0.24% 0.38% 0.51% 
Total EMF  0.16% 1.47% 1.07% 1.02% 1.59% 
 
Sources:  IMF’s IFS and WB’s WDI. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's, India's, & Indonesia's central banks, Singapore Dept. of Statistics, CEIC, 
IMF's WEO, & Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 23: Equity Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Average 
 
Equity, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.1 0.9 7.2 3.3 7.0 
Americas 0.5 12.5 6.0 0.4 12.3 
Asia 0.7 11.2 3.7 55.0 93.4 
Europe 0.0 1.7 3.9 1.5 5.7 
Middle East  -0.1 0.5 1.3 2.0 4.2 
Total EMF  4.3 26.8 22.1 62.2 122.7 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., & Centennial 
Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
  32Table 24: Equity Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Average, by % GDP 
 
Equity % GDP, 
Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.05% 0.30% 2.26% 0.92% 1.22% 
Americas 0.07% 0.88% 0.32% 0.02% 0.54% 
Asia 0.06% 0.50% 0.13% 1.46% 1.72% 
Europe 0.00% 0.19% 0.41% 0.14% 0.29% 
Middle East  -0.04% 0.13% 0.24% 0.31% 0.44% 
Total EMF  0.14% 0.51% 0.33% 0.82% 1.10% 
 
Sources:  IMF’s IFS and WB’s WDI. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & India's central banks, CEIC, WB's Global Dev. Fin., IMF's WEO, & 
Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 25: Debt Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages 
 
Debt, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.2 1.8 3.5 0.3 -1.2 
Americas 2.0 31.4 26.8 0.8 6.0 
Asia 1.3 13.2 7.9 5.5 18.1 
Europe 0.6 3.7 11.2 8.3 31.5 
Middle East  0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 1.3 
Total EMF  3.9 50.2 49.5 15.5 55.7 
 
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & Indonesia's central banks, CEIC, & Centennial Estimates. 
Hong Kong excluded before 1998. 
 
 
Table 26: Debt Inflows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages, by % GDP 
 
Debt % GDP  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa -0.10% 0.62% 1.10% 0.09% -0.21% 
Americas 0.26% 2.22% 1.41% 0.05% 0.26% 
Asia 0.11% 0.59% 0.27% 0.15% 0.33% 
Europe 0.12% 0.40% 1.18% 0.78% 1.59% 
Middle East  0.05% 0.04% 0.01% 0.08% 0.14% 
Total EMF  0.13% 0.96% 0.74% 0.20% 0.50% 
  
Sources:  IMF’s IFS and WB’s WDI. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's & Indonesia's central banks, CEIC, IMF's WEO, & Centennial Estimates.  







  33Table 27: Net Bank Flows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages 
 
Net Banks, Av. 85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa 0.2 0.0 -0.8 -3.1 -0.5 
Americas -2.5 0.5 1.1 -4.2 -11.1 
Asia -0.9 10.5 -50.0 -6.9 -14.2 
Europe -4.4 1.9 2.2 1.9 30.3 
Middle East  -3.6 1.4 11.8 -0.5 -2.5 
Total EMF  -11.2 14.3 -35.7 -12.8 2.0 
  
Source:  IMF’s IFS. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's Central Bank, the Singapore Dept. of Statistics, & CEIC.  
Hong Kong excluded before 1998.  
 
 
Table 28: Net Bank Flows, Long Term Trend, Period Averages, by % GDP 
 
Net Banks % 
GDP, Av.  85-90 91-96 97-98 99-04 2005 
Africa 0.08% 0.01% -0.24% -0.87% -0.09% 
Americas -0.32% 0.03% 0.06% -0.24% -0.49% 
Asia -0.08% 0.47% -1.69% -0.18% -0.26% 
Europe -0.89% 0.21% 0.23% 0.18% 1.53% 
Middle East  -0.94% 0.35% 2.18% -0.08% -0.26% 
Total EMF  -0.36% 0.27% -0.53% -0.17% 0.02% 
  
Sources:  IMF’s IFS and WB’s WDI. 
To fill in missing data, Taiwan's Central Bank, the Singapore Dept. of Statistics, IMF's WEO, & CEIC.  









  342006 Global Meeting 
The Emerging Markets Forum is a not-for-profit initiative 
that brings together high level government and corporate 
leaders from around the world for dialogue on the key eco-
nomic, financial and social issues facing emerging market 
countries – a dialogue that concludes with consensus and 
commitment to actionable outcomes.   
 
The Forum is focused on some 50 emerging markets 
economies in Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and 
Africa that share prospects of superior economic perform-
ance, already have or seek to create a conducive business 
environment and are of near term interest to private inves-
tors, both domestic and international.  
 
The dialogue at the EMF Global and Regional Meetings is 
based on  a Series of papers written by world-renowned 
authorities exclusively for these meetings. 
 
For more information about the Emerging Markets Forum, 
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